Abstract
In the recent decades protest participation has become most widely accepted and practiced form of citizen engagement in western democracies. Many researchers believe protest participation is crucial for democracy to be consolidated and effective, and previous studies have shown that protest participation is one of the main characteristics of a democratic public. Though protest is on the increase in western democracies, it declined in postcommunist democracies from 1990 to 2000. The bulk of participation research still comes from western countries and less is known about participation patterns of postcommunist and especially post-Yugoslav citizens. More importantly, previous cross-national studies have mostly not dealt with the motivations behind protest participation in post-Yugoslav countries. The aim of our research was twofold: firstly, we compared levels of protest participation (signing petitions, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations) in three regions: seven post-Yugoslav countries (BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), seventeen established EU democracies, and nine East-Central European EU member states. Secondly, we analyzed the relationship between protest participation and prodemocratic political culture (i.e. democracy index consisting of items indicating acceptance of democracy and rejecting authoritarian rule) in all three regions. We employed the newest (2008) wave of European Values Study, which consists of representative national surveys. The results indicated that post-Yugoslav population is almost as protest oriented (Mprotest = 1.89) as citizens in western countries (M = 1.93), and significantly more than ECE EU member states (M = 1.55). Interestingly, within post-Yugoslav countries, citizens of Kosovo and Macedonia report the highest levels of protest potential. The results also showed that protest participation is positively and statistically significantly associated with prodemocratic orientations in all three regions, as well as within all seven post-Yugoslav national samples. If Europeanization of West Balkan countries is understood in terms of their populations taking part in elite-challenging behaviour (e.g. protest participation) motivated by pro-democratic orientations,
then all non-EU post-Yugoslav countries are well on their path to Europe. Indeed, if Europe “keeps them out”, democratic protests might follow shortly, if, of course, pro-EU membership attitudes will be present in six post-Yugoslav countries at the critical times in the future. Implications of the results and future research suggestions are discussed. 

Key Words: protest participation, post-Yugoslav states, post-communist states, political culture, cross-national studies

Introduction

Understanding patterns of citizen participation in post-Yugoslav states is crucial for their integration within Europe. Post-Yugoslav states have in the past been affected by a particularly turbulent dissolution of the join state with ethnic strife and armed conflicts taking place not long ago. Many areas of political orientations of post-Yugoslav citizens have previously been studied (for instance, traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism and related non-democratic political-cultural orientations; see, for example, Flere and Molnar, 1994; Galić, 2000; Frieze et al., 2003; Sekulić and Šporer, 2006; Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007; Klajšek, 2007; Lavrič, 2007; Simkus; 2007a; Flere and Kirbiš, 2009a; 2009b; Kirbiš and Flere, 2010; 2011a; 2011b), while relatively few studies have dealt with patterns of citizen participation. To our knowledge no systematic cross-national studies exist which analyze and compare citizen participation in all seven post-Yugoslav states (for an exception see Kirbiš, 2011). One of the dimensions of citizen participation is especially important for “effective” democracy to take place (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) – protest participation. The present study examined cross-national differences on protest participation on representative samples of post-Yugoslav citizens. We also compared protest participation patterns in postcommunist and established democracies. In addition, we were interested in the motivation behind protest participation in the observed environment. Specifically, we investigated whether prodemocratic political culture is associated with protest participation. Employed data source was the European Values Study (EVS), fielded in 2008. The EVS covered the following former Yugoslav entities: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.
I. Citizen Participation and Democracy

Aristotle, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill and since them many contemporary authors have emphasized the importance of citizen participation (see Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1972; Dalton, 1996; Barnes, 2004). Participatory democrats (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984) and democratic realists (Schumpeter, 1952; Sartori, 1987) agree that citizen participation is a central condition of democracy (Parry and Moyser, 1994: 46; also Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1975; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002). As Verba aptly put it: citizen participation is “at the heart of democracy” (Verba et al., 1995: 1).

Longitudinal research regarding the participation trends has shown that changes in patterns and levels of participation have been taking place in Western and postcommunist Europe in recent decades. Specifically, many studies point to a decrease in levels of voter turnout (e.g., Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Wattenberg, 1998; Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, 2007; Macedo et al., 2005), party membership and strength of party attachment (Katz et al., 1992; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Scarrow, 2007), social participation, e.g., decrease in membership in voluntary organizations (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Putnam, 1995; 2000), trust in politicians (Holmberg, 1999) and political/state institutions (Crozier et al., 1975; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995). These trends have led many authors to pose questions regarding the future of democracy (see, for instance, Kaase and Newton, 1995: ch. 7.; Macedo et al., 2005).

Our definition of citizen participation in line with Vromen’s (2003: 82–83) definition of participation as “acts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in”. Researchers have on the basis of theoretical and empirical findings differentiated between several dimensions of citizen participation (see, among others, Verba et al., 1995; Makarovič, 2002; Vromen, 2003; Claggett and Pollock, 2006), most often conventional political participation, protest participation and civic participation (see
Protest participation (e.g., signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations) is one of the central non-institutionalized, direct, individualized forms of citizen participation, and is considered by many researchers as a key component of effective and stable democracy (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2007; Welzel, 2007). Specifically, readiness to engage in protest is considered a characteristic of a democratic public (see Kaase and Marsh, 1979; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Past studies have namely shown that those citizens who are willing to engage in protest behaviour accept the basic democratic values to a higher degree.²

Protest participation has been on the rise in recent decades, mostly because of the process of (post)modernization. Socioeconomic development has caused changes in political culture (orientations – values, cognitions, feelings) towards political and social objects (e.g. toward political system, public officials, and external authority in general) among citizens in established and postcommunist democracies. The process of modernization and postmodernization caused the reduction of political trust among citizens, while self-expression values gained priorities and “critical” citizens emerged (Norris, 1999; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). In other words, citizens have increasingly obtained the objective means and subjective abilities to confront political elites and engage in elite-challenging participation (Inglehart, 1997; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Inglehart in Welzel, 2007; Welzel, 2007). While conventional political participation (i.e. institutional participation linked with party politics) has been declining in recent decades, protest participation

² One of such values is for instance political tolerance, which denotes that respondents allow the full legal rights of citizenship to groups they themselves dislike (see Sullivan et al., 1982). In other words, political tolerance is the “willingness to grant rights and freedoms to enemies” (Guérin et al., 2004: 371). It can be a assumed that “protesters” can therefore play a crucial role in the process of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states.
has been on the rise in western democracies, though it has declined in the first decade since the collapse of communism in postcommunist countries (see Inglehart in Catterberg, 2000; compare with Kirbiš and Flere, 2011c). Research therefore increasingly indicates that “cause-oriented” politics is on the rise (see Norris, 2004; Harris et al., 2010).

Modernization approach is one of the central theoretical frameworks for explaining cross-national differences in citizen engagement, including protest participation. It is argued that socioeconomic development causes changes in democratic (e.g. self-expressive, participatory) political culture, which in turn influences the performance of democratic institutions (see Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2000; Norris, 2002; Welzel, 2007). Not surprisingly that participation is therefore regarded as one of the indicators of functioning of democracy (Parry and Moyser, 1994: 46; Vanhanen, 1990: 17-18). The main hypothesis of modernization theory is that there are higher levels of citizen engagement in socioeconomically more developed countries and in established democracies, compared to less developed countries and postcommunist democracies.

Previous research confirms that 1) numerous indicators of citizen participation reach higher levels in countries that are economically more developed (see Norris, 2002; Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Janmaat, 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Newton and Montero, 2007; Roller and Rudi, 2008); and 2) levels of participation are higher in established democracies, compared to postcommunist democracies (see, among others, Mason, 1995; Siemieniak, 2002; Barnes, 2004; Adam et al., 2005; Rus and Toš, 2005; Newton and Montero, 2007; Roßteutscher, 2008).

III. Democratic Political Culture, Participation and Democracy

According to Lipset, one of the political sociology’s prime concerns is “an analysis of the social conditions making for democracy” (1959/1994: 1). From April 1974 to the early 1990s a “third wave” of democratization took place – a transformation of authoritarian/totalitarian political systems into democratic ones (see Huntington, 1993). In the context of the process of democratization (i.e. political
modernization; see Rizman, 2002) two of its final goals are often emphasized: first, the formation of political system with democratic institutions and elements (e.g. democratic procedures, free and fair elections, voting rights, pluralism, freedom of expression, institutional mechanism of checks and balances; see Schumpeter, 1943/2003; Dahl, 1972; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Inglehart, 1997); and second, the formation of democratic political culture (people’s subjective orientations, values and beliefs, which are supportive of democracy) and democratic political behaviour of the general public (Pridham and Lewis, 1996: 2; Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, 2007). In other words, though within institutional (minimalist) understandings of democracy the latter is primarily equated with democratic institutions (Dahl, 1972; Sartori, 1987; Linz and Stepan, 1996), numerous researchers emphasize that democratic institutional arrangements (“formal” democracy) (Welzel et al., 2003: 350) do not necessarily guarantee the existence of “effective” (actual) democracy (Rose and Shin, 2001; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). As Klingemann and colleagues (2006: 2) summarize it:

“[The] persistence of democratic regimes cannot be taken for granted. For democracy to persist and become consolidated, it is usually not enough to enjoy favourable internal and external structural conditions. Nor is it enough to skilfully engineer institutions. With the passage of years and increasing body of empirical insight, it has become evident that it is difficult to understand the trajectories of democracy-building without considering political culture”.

The authors of the present paper agree with presented views and believe that in the context of democratic consolidation of new (post-Yugoslav) democracies two points need special attention: 1) political behaviour of mass public (for instance, protest behaviour); and 2) citizens’ motivations behind the mass behaviour (subjective (political) orientations). Furthermore, we argue it is important to examine whether higher levels of participation are found among citizen who are non-democratically oriented (who express authoritarian, traditional, “subject” political culture; see Almond and Verba, 1963; Dyker, 1979; Almond, 1989; Pribersky, 1996; Pantić, 1998; Wessels and Klingemann, 1998; Galić, 2000; Miheljak, 2002; Tomšič, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2003; Pantić and Pavlović, 2009) or whether “democrats” are more participatory citizens. If “authoritarians” are found to have higher levels of
citizen participation, that might pose a danger to the process of consolidation of new democracies (Thomassen in van Deth, 1998: 154). Specifically, such patterns might present an opportunity for the rise of authoritarian, nationalistic and populist political elites. A realistic possibility of such occurrence can be traced back to the past events in the last two decades on the territories of former Yugoslavia (see Ramet, 2002; Rizman, 2002).

This paper builds on the analysis of Klingemann and colleagues (2006) who have analyzed levels of democratic political culture and its correlates in postcommunist Europe and established western democracies. Specifically, Klingemann et al. have analyzed World Values Survey data from 1999, and compared three groups of countries: 1) three democratic reference countries3; 2) Central European countries4; and 3) Eastern European countries5.

Present analysis also focuses on three groups of countries, but our criterion for the selection of countries is more formal and all-inclusive. In the first group of countries we include 17 established EU member states (ECE).6 In the second group we include nine postcommunist EU member states (all with the exception of Slovenia).7 Finally, in the third group we include all post-Yugoslav countries.8 We compared post-Yugoslav states among themselves, as well as the post-Yugoslav group of countries with the ECE EU9 and EU17.

IV. Study Rationale and Hypotheses

Substantial literature gap exists with regards to postcommunist countries. For instance, modernization theory cannot successfully explain some participation patterns in postcommunist states: specifically, within the postcommunist country

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3 USA, Norway and West Germany.
4 East Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
5 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia
6 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
7 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic.
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.
pool, no association has been found between political participation levels and socioeconomic development at the aggregate level (see Kostadinova, 2003). Duch (1998), for instance, found that in economically less developed postcommunist countries citizens have higher potential for protest participation. Consequently some authors believe that socioeconomic stability can make citizens politically passive (Miheljak, 2006: 131) (which is opposite of predictions of modernization theory). For instance, among the new democracies, Slovenia is socioeconomically most developed, but has the least politically engaged citizens according to several indicators (see Bashkirova, 2002: 323; Rus and Toš, 2005; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). Similar findings have also been noted in studies prior to Yugoslavia’s dissolution (Mihailović, 1986; Miljević and Poplašen, 1991).

In addition, previous research of citizen orientations and behaviour in postcommunist states has rarely dealt with post-Yugoslav states. For instance, some studies of postcommunist states do not deal with post-Yugoslav countries (e.g. Pridham and Lewis, 1996), while in other studies only Slovenia is analyzed together with other Central and Eastern European postcommunist states (e.g. Kolenc, 2002; Plasser and Pribersky, 1996; Rose et al., 1998; Mishler and Rose, 2001b; Adam et al., 2005; Smith, 2009). Still other studies include some of the post-Yugoslav states (mostly Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia; see Berglund et al., 2004), and also BiH (Westle and Gabriel, 2009). Sometimes other combinations of post-Yugoslav states are present in the studies (see, for instance, Esmer, 2002; Baskin and Pickering, 2005; Flere and Lavrič, 2007; Flere and Klanjšek, 2009; Flere and Kirbiš, 2009a; 2009b). Lastly, there are also studies which include all post-Yugoslav states with the exception of Slovenia (e.g. Simkus, 2007a). Though research prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia have often dealt with all then-republics and territories (e.g. study of Yugoslav Youth in 1986 (Jupio, 1986) and 1990, and Yugoslav public opinion in 1990, see Flere, 1986; Mihailović, 1986; Pantić, 1990a; Mihailović et al., 1990; Goati, 1991; Miljević and Poplašen, 1991; Vasović, 1991a), there are no recent systematic comparative studies of post-Yugoslav societies, which include all relevant political entities (for an exception see Kirbiš, 2011). Therefore, the aim of the present research was to compare post-Yugoslav countries with other postcommunist EU members and with established EU democracies.
Based on the previous literature, we formed several hypotheses. In accordance with modernization approach, we predicted (H1) that higher levels of protest participation would be found in established democracies (these countries are also socioeconomically more developed) than in postcommunist states (ECE9 and PostYu7 countries; see Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Janmaat, 2006; Newton and Montero, 2007). Next, in line with modernization approach we predicted that within post-Yugoslav states socioeconomically more developed countries would have higher levels of protest participation (H2). Finally, based on the previous literature we also anticipated (H3) that within post-Yugoslav states protest participation would be positively associated with democratic political culture (i.e. democracy index, e.g. Klingemann et al., 2006; also see Guérin et al., 2004).

V. Plan of Analysis

First, employed method, sample and measures are presented. Then the cross-country and between-group differences in protest participation are analyzed. Finally, we analyze the association between prodemocratic political culture and protest participation in Western democracies, ECE9 EU member states and in post-Yugoslav states.

A. Method

1. Sample

The employed data in our analyses was the European Values Study, which is one of the few survey datasets that covers all former Yugoslav republics and territories. As Simkus (2007b: 3) rightfully notes, there is a relative lack of cross-national social survey data on Balkan states. The newest wave of European Values Study (2008) has largely overcome this empirical gap. World Values Survey (and within WVS also EVS) is the largest quantitative dataset gathered by scientists from the large part of the world. The aim of WVS and EVS is to study changes in mass values and political orientation and their influence of social and political life. Surveys in all countries included in WVS were carried out with national funding. Combined the WVS survey included almost 90 % of world population. WVS and EVS have in the past been carried out in 97 countries, while the present study deals with 33
countries. All 33 national surveys were carried out on representative national samples. Samples were drawn from the entire population of 18 years and older, and the minimum sample was 1000 respondents. In majority of countries there was no upper age limit imposed and some form of stratified random sampling was used to obtain representative national samples (Toš, 2008; for additional methodological information see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).

B. Measures

1. Protest Participation

Protest participation was tapped by three Likert format items: “signing a petition”, “joining in boycotts”, and “attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations” (1 = would never do, 2 = have done, 3 = would do).\(^9\) We created a summation scale of protest participation based on the Cronbach’s alphas, which varied across post-Yugoslav countries from \(\alpha = 0.59\) (Kosovo) to \(\alpha = 0.86\) (FYR Macedonia). Cronbach’s alphas across the three regions were \(\alpha = 0.80\) in Post-Yu7, \(\alpha = 0.75\) in ECE EU9 and \(\alpha = 0.73\) in EU17 country group.

2. Democracy Index (Democratic Political Culture)

Our measure of democratic political culture was identical to the one used by Klingemann and colleagues (2006: 18–19). Four Likert format items were employed; two of them measured attitudes toward democracy and two of them concerned attitudes toward authoritarian political system.

The two “democratic” items were worded as follows:

“I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?”

“Having a democratic political system.”

\(^9\) The actual question in the EVS questionnaire was framed as follows: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.
“I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree or (1) disagree strongly?”

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.”

The two “authoritarian” items were worded as follows:

“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?”

“Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”

I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?

“Having the army rule.”

Scores of items measuring attitudes toward authoritarian system as a form of government were added and subtracted from the sum of scores of two items measuring democracy as an ideal (see Klingemann et al., 2006). Since 4 items were included in the scale the scale values were then divided by 4. Final scale values ran from 1 (most authoritarian orientations) to 4 (most democratic orientations).

Democracy index summation scale showed sufficient internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from $\alpha = 0.38$ (FYR Macedonia) to $\alpha = 0.56$ (Slovenia) across post-Yugoslav countries.\(^{10}\) Cronbach’s alphas across three regions were $\alpha = 0.39$ in Post-Yu7, $\alpha = 0.53$ in ECE EU9 and $\alpha = 0.61$ in EU17 country pool.

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\(^{10}\) The exception was Kosovo, where Cronbach's alpha was merely $\alpha = 0.07$. Despite low internal consistency of this scale we included Kosovo in our analysis.

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C. Results

First, we compared levels of protest participation in three regions: seven post-Yugoslav countries (BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), group of seventeen established EU democracies, and group of East-Central European EU members (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Mean levels of protest participation in European countries and Pearson coefficients of association between protest participation and democratic political culture.

The results indicated that citizens in post-Yugoslav states are almost as protest oriented (Mprotest = 1.89) as citizens in western countries (M = 1.93), and significantly more than ECE EU members (M = 1.55). Therefore we can confirm H1 that predicted higher levels of protest participation would be found in established democracies. Interestingly, all post-Yugoslav states have protest participation means above the ECE EU9 country-group.

Next, within post-Yugoslav countries, citizens of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia report the highest levels of protest potential, while citizens of Montenegro and BiH are the least protest oriented. In other words, within post-Yugoslav states there seems to be no association between levels of socioeconomic development and mean levels of protest participation (post-Yugoslav countries in Figure 1 are order...
according to the levels of economic development from the left (economically least developed Kosovo) to the right (economically most developed Slovenia). H2, which stated that socioeconomically more developed countries would have higher levels of protest participation, cannot be confirmed.

Finally, based on the previous literature we also anticipated (H3) that within post-Yugoslav states protest participation would be positively associated with democratic political culture (democracy index). The line graph in Figure 1 confirms such prediction. Specifically, our analyses of the relationship between protest participation and democratic political culture showed that protest participation was positively and statistically significantly associated with prodemocratic orientations in all three regions, including within all seven post-Yugoslav national samples. Pearson coefficients between protest participation and democracy index in post-Yugoslav countries ranged from r = 0.06 (FYR Macedonia) to r = 0.21 (BiH). Based on these results we can confirm H3.

**Conclusion**

Present research compared levels of protest participation (signing petitions, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations) in three European regions: seven post-Yugoslav countries, seventeen established EU democracies, and nine East-Central European EU member states. Specifically, we were interested whether levels of protest participation are higher in established democracies, compared to postcommunist democracies, as previous studies have shown with regard to different dimensions of citizen participation (see, among others, Mason, 1995; Barnes, 2004; Adam et al., 2005; Rus and Toš, 2005; Newton and Montero, 2007; Roßteutscher, 2008). We also analyzed whether differences in mean protest levels within post-Yugoslav countries sample pool are associated with levels of socioeconomic development, as modernization theory would predict and as it has been found in previous studies in Western countries (see Norris, 2002; Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Janmaat, 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Newton and Montero, 2007; Roller and Rudi, 2008). Thirdly, we analyzed the relationship between protest participation and prodemocratic political culture (democracy index consisting of items indicating acceptance of democracy and rejecting authoritarian rule) in all three regions. We
employed the newest (2008) wave of European Values Study, which consists of representative national surveys.

According to our results, H1 and H3 were confirmed, while H2 was not. Turning to the latter, it seems that in post-Yugoslav context levels of citizen participation (in our case protest participation) remain unassociated with levels of socioeconomic development, as studies before the dissolution of Yugoslavia have shown (see Mihailović, 1986; Miljević and Poplašen, 1991). Our results also corroborate the findings of more recent studies of post-Yugoslav states (Kirbiš, 2011; Kirbiš and Flere, 2010; 2011b). It seems that other factors come into play when explaining citizen participation differences at the aggregate level and further research is granted to analyze which determinants contribute to this kind of cross-national pattern of post-Yugoslav between-country differences.

As predicted by H1, citizens in established EU17 member states are more protest oriented than postcommunist citizens. What is encouraging from post-Yugoslav point of view is that citizens in post-Yugoslav sample are almost as protest oriented as citizens in EU17 (and much more protest oriented then ECE EU9 citizens). In fact, citizens of Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and Croatia are more protest oriented than the average EU17 citizen. Finally, results also showed that protest participation is positively and statistically significantly associated with democratic political culture in all three observed regions. In fact, the link is positive in all seven post-Yugoslav countries.

If Europeanization of West Balkan countries is understood in terms of their populations taking part in elite-challenging behaviour (e.g. protest participation) motivated by pro-democratic orientations, then all non-EU post-Yugoslav countries seem well on their path to Europe. In fact, if levels of protest participation are compared, post-Yugoslav states are more similar to established democracies than postcommunist EU9 country pooled sample.

Still, we have to keep in mind past research has shown that although higher socioeconomic development is not necessarily associated with higher levels of citizen participation, it is associated with mean levels of pro-democratic (positively) and non-democratic (negatively) political orientations (see Kirbiš, 2011). In other words, we argue that future prospects of democratic consolidation in post-Yugoslav states will
mainly depend on future levels of socioeconomic growth and (non)existence of unfavourable contextual factors, especially within- and between country political tensions.

Also, future studies of post-Yugoslav states should analyze other motivational determinants of protest participation. For instance, how are other important elements of democratic political culture (e.g. self-expression values, social and political trust, subjective political efficacy, etc.) associated with protest participation and other dimensions of citizen engagement: conventional participation (electoral turnout, party membership, contacting political officials) and civic (social) participation (membership in voluntary organizations, donations to charity, etc.). This research seems especially important since most recent studies of post-Yugoslav states seem to indicate that conventional political participation is often associated with “subject” (e.g. authoritarian, traditional) political orientations (see Kirbiš, 2011).

In sum, past studies have shown that democratic consolidation depends heavily on political culture and behaviour of mass public (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). With this paper we aimed to add a relevant contribution to the field of political sociology and expand the knowledge on patterns of citizen participation to all post-Yugoslav states. If protest participation is taken as an indicator, post-Yugoslav citizens do not differ significantly from western citizens. It seems that protests in post-Yugoslav states are mainly democratically motivated (of course, specific public events might be organized by populist and nationalist political elite and in turn, the nationalistic-oriented public might participate, but our results indicate that mainly democratic motivations are behind protest engagement). On the basis of results one could conclude that if European Union keeps post-Yugoslav states in front of its borders, democratic protests might follow. Of course, this largely depends on whether pro-EU membership attitudes will be present in six post-Yugoslav countries at the critical times in the future.
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU decision makers could not set up a structure that could cope with the EU’s global and obstinate problems. The only profit obtained from the Treaty of Lisbon was postponing dealing with problems for a later date. But change is inevitable for the EU. If the EU will not change, it will face an obligation to turn into a regional organization, a little more than a simple economic cooperation platform. In order for the EU to get rid of this negativity there is only one way that it must go and that is transformation. For this transformation, a ring-shaped structure can be proposed. The proposed unique structure for the EU is to be composed of five different groups as core and periphery. Those members may change at certain times. To complete the transformation with success, Turkey must be within the EU transformation. It is essential to include Turkey in the core zone. As mentioned in the study, the only way to cope with the problems and become a global actor is Turkey’s accession into the EU.

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